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Are Asian democracies deconsolidating, in line with world-wide 
trends?  This article examines four consolidated democracies in 
Asia: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, plus Indonesia, whose 
own consolidation has been problematic.  Using public opinion 
data, we evaluate two competing models—civic culture and 
political economy—to test whether there is a decline in 
democratic support.  We report that the political economy model 
is more persuasive.  Declines in democratic support are associated 
more consistently with democratic performance and education.  
Because education levels are tending to rise, and political 
socialization continues into adulthood, we conclude that there 
should be little fear that Asian democracies will deconsolidate. 
 





“The whole spectrum of  regimes in the world is moving in the wrong direction. 
Liberal democracies … are under pressure of  becoming less liberal, less tolerant.  
Countries that are democracies but maybe not liberal ones … are at very serious 
risk of  sliding back into authoritarian rule.  And countries that have been 
authoritarian are becoming more authoritarian” (Diamond 2017). 
“Citizens of  democracies are less and less content with their institutions; 
they are more and more willing to jettison institutions and norms that have 
traditionally been regarded as central components of  democracy; and they are 
increasingly attracted to alternative regime forms” (Foa and Mounk 2016, 16).  
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These two quotations reflect a general conclusion about recent 
democratic decline, a regression that has occurred in many consolidated 
democracies.  Mass support for democratic institutions has weakened.  This 
sweeping conclusion is alarming, particularly to those who believe that 
democracy is the best system of government.  These trends also stand in contrast 
to earlier claims that democracy represents “the end of history” (Fukuyama 
1992). 
Democratic deconsolidation reflects the attitudinal decline in support for 
democracy as a system and the increase in support for authoritarianism.  It is 
not attributable to negative evaluations of government performance under 
democratic systems, which previous studies have termed the attitudes of a 
“critical citizenry.”  This critical stance is not a threat to democracy, but is 
instead a sign of a healthy democracy (Norris 1999; Mujani, Liddle, and 
Ambardi 2018).  Other analysts have challenged the basic thesis of decline in 
support for democracy, arguing that decline is not a universal phenomenon.  
Consistent with this claim, there have indeed been many fluctuations in support 
for democracy over time (Inglehart 2016). 
The most important aspect of democratic deconsolidation discussed 
above by Foa and Mounk (2016) is inter-generational.  In their view, the future 
of democracy is threatened, as can be seen in patterns of support for democracy 
by generations.  The millennial generation, compared with its predecessor (or 
with more senior citizens), is argued to have a predilection towards support for 
authoritarianism, not democracy.  These studies also show that the millennial 
generation is less engaged in politics, an important indicator because in a 
democracy political engagement is considered crucial to make the system 
function well and thus sustain high levels of attitudinal support. 
Generations are considered an important unit of analysis because each 
generation is the product of a unique form of political socialization.  The 
political attitudes of a generation, including toward democracy, are formed 
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when they are young, which will influence their future political attitudes.  If the 
millennial generation holds negative attitudes toward democracy now, they will 
continue to hold these attitudes in the future.  
Education is a potentially more important factor than generational 
difference.  Education generally has a positive effect on consolidation or support 
for democracy, as has been shown in many previous studies (Lipset 1959; Norris 
1999, 2011).  Only if education results in the decline of support for democracy 
will democracy’s future be endangered, because levels of education have been 
increasing worldwide (UNDP).1 
We examine this issue by exploring four Asian democracies: Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia.  Using level of freedom measures that are 
regularly reported by Freedom House, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are the three 
Asian democracies that have become the most consolidated to date (Freedom 
House 2020).  Their democratic progress is about the same as previously 
established democracies in North America and Western Europe.  These three 
cases are therefore highly relevant to the deconsolidation issue.  Previous 
assessments of East Asian democracies have found consolidation particularly in 
the three countries (Park 2007; McAllister 2016).  According to a more recent 
study, however, Asian democracy is backsliding (Croissant and Diamond 2020).  
The time is therefore ripe to examine the three democracies again with new 
data.   
Indonesia, a new democracy, was once considered consolidated during 
the twenty-year period since the restoration of democracy (Liddle and Mujani 
2013).  Recently, however, Freedom House has concluded that freedom in 
Indonesia has declined, from Fully Free in 2006-2012, to Partly Free since then 
(Freedom House 2020; Aspinall et al 2020; Mietzner 2020).  The Indonesian 
case adds new variation to this issue.  
                                                 
1 https://www.epdc.org/sites/default/files/documents/Global_Educational_Trends_1970-2025.pdf, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdro_statistical_data_table2.pdf  
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Are their signs of deconsolidation in these four cases?  And if so, how 
can we explain them?  We will evaluate the claims of Foa and Mounk that levels 
of political interest and generational differences are the crucial factors.  Other 
studies find that socioeconomic measures, such as education, strongly predict 
democratic consolidation (Przeworski et al 2000; Croissant 2007; Lipset 1959).  
Political economy is yet another explanation.  In this model, support for a 
regime such as democracy depends on how the regime performs: if well, the 
people will support it; if poorly, they will not (Clark, Dutts, and Kronberg 1993).  
Do these measures travel to Asia? 
 
Concepts, Measures, Method, and Data 
Foa and Mounk’s deconsolidation argument and Inglehart’s response use public 
opinion data from the World Value Survey (Foa and Mounk 2016; Inglehart 
2016).  Foa and Mounk focus on two mass-level indicators: support for 
democracy and support for authoritarianism.  Support for democracy has 
declined and support for authoritarianism has increased.  They label these trends 
democratic deconsolidation. 
Public opinion survey data such as the World Value Survey and, in Asia, 
the Asian Barometer, are relevant to discuss deconsolidation because they 
regularly and intensively collect data about relevant attitudes.  In the Asian 
Barometer surveys, support for democracy as an attitudinal concept has been 
measured with several indicators that are more complex and believed to be more 
accurate than the one or two indicators used by Foa and Mounk (2016).  This 
article relies on the Asian Barometer, which has regularly collected data in 
Asian countries over the last 15 years.   
The attitudinal measures of democratic consolidation in the Asian 
Barometer are about regime preference, preference for a strong leader, 
preference for one political party, democratic expectation, democratic 
suitability, problems of democracy, support for army-led government, support 
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for expert-led government, support for gender equality, and freedom of speech 
and ideas.2  The survey method is probability sampling, which is believed to 
produce samples that represent national public opinion in each country.3 
 
Findings 
Our first indicator of democratic support is stated regime preference.4  In general, 
in the four Asian democracies, a majority of citizens support democracy (i.e., 
“democracy is always preferable to any kind of government”).  From 2000-2019 
support for democracy rose while support for alternatives declined.  In the 2000s 
the opinion that democracy is always preferable was 57%, which increased to 
65% in 2019, statistically significant at p<.001.5  
 Among the four countries, the highest support across time was among 
Indonesians (75%) and the lowest among Taiwanese (49%).  If we examine the 
tendencies in each country, we can see significant variation.  In Japan, support 
fluctuates but in general declines from 77% in the early 2000s to 64% in 2012, and 
increases again to 73% in 2016, significant at p<.001.  Taiwan is similar.   
Conversely, in Korea, democratic preference strengthened over the same 
period.  In the early 2000s, democratic preference among Koreans was 49%, a 
figure which increased very significantly to 65% in 2015.  Indonesia is similar.  
The percentage of Indonesians who prefer democracy increases from 74% in 2006 
to 79% in 2019, statistically significant at p<.001. 
Democratic support can also be measured by the rejection of support for 
strong leaders who are not chosen by the people and who are willing to suspend 
                                                 
2 Wordings, scorings, and codings of all measures will be directly presented in the findings section.   
3 Concerning method and data, see Asian Barometer at http://www.asianbarometer.org/survey/survey-
methods  
4Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion? 1. Democracy is always preferable to 
any other kind of government; 2. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be 
preferable to a democratic one; 3. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic 
or nondemocratic regime.  In the descriptive analysis, responses of don’t know, no answer, and don’t 
understand are treated as missing values. 
5 Analysis of variance (Anova) statistics are applied in all bivariate analysis in this article. 
Journal of Global Strategic Studies 





parliament.6  In general people in the four democracies oppose a strong leader.  
They disagree with the notion that leaders should dispense with parliament and 
elections.  However, support for a strong leader varies and fluctuates over time 
and country.  In general, the strongest rejection is from the Japanese (mean score 
3.303 on a 1-4 scale), and the weakest from Indonesians, although it is worth 
noting that Indonesians still reject the idea of strong leader (mean score 2.964).  
Nonetheless, in Japan, disagreement with the idea of a strong leader tended to 
decrease from 3.412 in 2003 to 3.337 in 2015, and in Indonesia from 3.012 in 
2006 to 2.967 in 2019.  The decreases are statistically significant at p<.001.  In 
Korea the pattern is relatively stable, while in Taiwan disagreement increased 
from 2.963 in 2001 to 3.039 in 2014, statistically significant at p<.001.  
If support for democracy is measured by the extent to which people reject 
a one-party system—which does away with party contestation, a democratic 
precondition—in general people in the four countries support democracy.7  This 
support has increased over time in the four nations, from 3.117 in the early 2000s 
to 3.257 in the 2015s.  The highest rejection of the one-party system among the 
four countries is Japan (mean score 3.368), the lowest Indonesia (mean score 
2.994).  In addition, in Japan rejection has intensified from 3.105 in 2003 to 3.478 
in 2016, while in Korea and Taiwan it has fluctuated but also tended to 
strengthen.  In Indonesia, on the contrary, it has weakened, from 3.079 in 2006 to 
2.988 in 2019.  This decline is statistically significant at p<001. 
Democratic support can also be seen in citizen perceptions as to “how 
suited democracy is to our country.”8  In several surveys of the four Asian 
democracies, citizens consistently think that democracy is suitable for their 
countries.  There is some fluctuation, but still within the range of positive support.  
                                                 
6 We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things: 1) strongly agree, 2) 
agree, 3) disagree, 4) strongly disagree. 
7 Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office: 1) strongly agree, 2) 
agree, 3) diasagree, 4) strongly disagree. 
8 On a 1-10 scale where 1 = completely unsuitable, and 10 = completely suitable, do you think democracy 
is suitable for our country? 
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The highest suitability is in Indonesia (mean score 7.614 on a 1-10 scale), the 
lowest Taiwan (mean score 7.007).  Viewed by country, the trends vary 
considerably.  In Korea and Taiwan support has tended to strengthen, while in 
Indonesia it fluctuates more. 
Democratic support can also be indicated by responses to the question 
whether democracy can resolve issues facing the country.9  The series of surveys 
in the four democracies shows that in general citizens believe that democracy can 
resolve such issues.  This confidence is highest in Indonesia (85%), lowest in 
Taiwan (62%), though both are within the positive range.  This trend has also 
intensified in the last fifteen years, from 70% to 74%.  The tendencies are all 
within the range of affirmative belief that democracy can solve problems.  The 
most positive trends are in Taiwan and Korea, they fluctuate in Indonesia, and in 
Japan they have tended to decline. 
In the Asian Barometer surveys, democratic support can also be seen in 
the extent to which citizens hope their country will continue to be a democracy in 
the future.10  In the four countries surveyed, nearly all citizens want their 
countries to continue to be democracies.  The highest are Indonesia (8.113 on a 
ten-point scale) and Taiwan (8.110), the lowest Japan (6.716), even though the 
latter is still within the positive range.  Support for this view in the last fifteen 
years has fluctuated, but it is still within the range of respondents hoping that 
their country will remain a democracy.  That fluctuation is visible in every 
country.  There is a decline in Indonesia and Japan but, again, still on average in 
favor of maintaining a democracy.  In Taiwan the hope has gotten stronger over 
time, while in Korea it has fluctuated or been stable. 
The perception that democracy is the best form of government even 
though it has problems is also a good indicator of democratic support.11  In the 
                                                 
9 Wording: Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? 1. Democracy cannot 
solve our society’s problems. 2) Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society. 
10 On a 1-10 scale, where 1 = not democratic at all, 10 = fully democratic, where would you expect our 
country to be in the future?  
11 Democracy may have its own problems, but it is still the best system of government: 1) strongly agree, 2) 
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surveys, a majority of people in the four democracies agree.  This attitude was in 
general stable in the last ten years.12  Per case, there is a significant difference, to 
be sure.  In Japan and Korea, the trends were stable.  In Taiwan support 
decreased from 2.916 to 2.613 (on a 1-4 scale), while in Indonesia it increased 
from 2.991 to 3.518.  
 Citizen rejection of military government is another indicator of democratic 
support, or conversely, supporting army rule indicates rejection of democracy.  In 
the four Asian democracies a majority of citizens reject the idea of a military 
takeover of the state.13  The highest rejection of military government is in Japan 
(3.793 on a 1-4 scale), the lowest in Indonesia (2.678), though in the latter, the 
population still on balance rejects a military takeover.  The tendency to reject 
military rule in the last fifteen years in the four nations has declined from 3.504 in 
the early 2000s to 3.363 in the last survey in 2019.  At the same time, there is 
significant variation.  In Korea and Taiwan the tendency to reject has grown, in 
Indonesia it fluctuates, and in Japan it has declined from 3.872 in the early 2000s 
to 3.790 in 2016. 
Opposition to government by experts without elections and without 
parliament is another indicator of democratic strength.  In the four Asian 
democracies, in general the citizenry reject the idea of government by experts, but 
there is variation over time.14  The highest rejection is seen in Japan (3.500 on a 1-
4 scale) and the lowest in Indonesia (2.916).  The general tendency is decline, but 
within the range of rejection (Table 2).  That rejection has decreased in Japan 
from 3.569 in 2003 to 3.498 in 2016 and has fluctuated more in Korea; it has 
strengthened in Taiwan from 3.028 in 2001 to 3.136 in 2014, and in Indonesia 
from 2.894 in 2012 to 2.954 in 2019. 
                                                                                                                                                        
agree, 3) disagree, 4) strongly disagree. Coding was reversed. 
12 This item was introduced only in the last two surveys (2011-2019). 
13 The army should come in to govern the country: 1) strongly agree, 2) agree, 3) disagree, 4) strongly 
disagree. 
14 We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people: 
1) strongly agree, 2) agree, 3) disagree, 4) strongly disagree. 
Journal of Global Strategic Studies 





The view that women do not need to involve themselves in politics as 
much as men is also an anti-democratic view.  In the four Asian democracies 
support for gender equality is a proxy for democratic support.15  The highest 
support is in Japan (3.525 on a 1-4 scale) and the lowest Indonesia (2.583), 
though still within the range of supporting gender equality on balance.  Over 
time, the general tendency is stability.  Looked at individually, there is a tendency 
for gender equality to decline in Japan (from 3.580 in 2011 to 3.468 in 2016), also 
in Korea (from 3.351 in 2011 to 3.255 in 2015), but to slightly increase in Taiwan 
(from 3.220 in 2011 to 3.265 in 2015) and to be stable in Indonesia.  
Education is important for democratic health, but democracy does not 
discriminate on the basis of differences in level of education.  The democratic 
principle is that the right to vote is the same for people with more and less 
education.  Most citizens in the four countries agree with this principle, although 
there is variation over time and across countries.16  Support for educational 
equality is highest in Japan (3.237 on a 1-4 scale) and lowest in Indonesia (2.892).  
In Japan support for this view declines from 3.277 in 2003 to 3.125 in 2016.  In 
Korea it fluctuates, in Taiwan it strengthens from 3.091 in 2001 to 3.130 in 2015, 
and in Indonesia it is relatively stable.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Democratic Support (Indicators and Index) 






20705 .00 1.00 .6199 .48541 
Reject strong leader 21194 .00 1.00 .8410 .36568 
Reject only one 
political party 
21268 .00 1.00 .8797 .32535 
Democratic suitability 21195 .00 1.00 .8207 .38365 
                                                 
15 Women should not be involved in politics as much as men: 1) strongly agree, 2) agree, 3) disagree, 4) 
strongly disagree. 
16 People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people: 1) 
strongly disagree, 2) disagree, 3) agree, 4) strongly agree. 
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21406 .00 1.00 .8848 .31927 
Democratic support 
index 
18980 .00 1.00 .8144 .20963 
 
Democrats also value highly freedom of speech and reject government 
control of citizens’ opinion expression.  Most members of our four Asian 
democracies support freedom of speech.17  The strongest are Japanese (3.154 on 
a 1-4 scale), the lowest Indonesians (2.461), even though, again, Indonesia is 
still in the range of supporting the free expression of ideas.  In Japan and 
Taiwan it has strengthened, in Korea it is stable, but in Indonesia it has declined 
from 2.504 in 2006 to 2.382 in 2019. 
Overall, in our four Asian countries the twelve indicators of democratic 
support that are thought to measure democratic consolidation are mostly 
positive.  Nevertheless, there is significant variation over time and place.  The 
lowest value indicator is regime preference (democratic preference) and the 
highest is rejection of army rule (Table 1).18  For all the combined indicators and 
waves, democratic support is highest in Japan and lowest in Taiwan (Table 2).  
As a factor, time fluctuates.  When we compare the first wave (2002-
2004) with the fourth (2014-2019), there is a general increase in support 
(Figure).  By country, there is variation:  Japan and Indonesia show declines, 
though still within the range of positive support.  In Korea and Taiwan, 
democratic support strengthens (Figure). 
                                                 
17 The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society: 
Strongly agree, 2) agree, 3) disagree, 4) strongly disagree. 
18 The combined score to form an index of democratic support is based on the indicators in the four cases 
in the same wave.  Indonesia joined Asian Barometer in Wave 2 (2006), so the trend that is observed in 
the index created includes 2006-2019.  Not all indicators are in each wave.  Five appear 
consistently: regime preference, strong leader, single party system, democratic suitability, and army 
government.  It is therefore only these five indicators that are analyzed further to provide a general 
picture of democratic support.  Because the scales that are used differ for those five items, comparability 
is achieved by using a dummy variable (1 = democratic support, 0 = otherwise).  These five items 
actually form two dimensions in a factor analysis, but the inter-item correlation is not negative.  In order 
to read it more simply we constructed an additive index of the five items to construct a single index of 
democratic support (0-1).  
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Table 2.  Democratic Support by Country (Anova) 
















Japan 4569 .8440 .20327 .00301 .8381 .8499 .00 1.00 
Korea 4588 .8181 .20369 .00301 .8122 .8240 .00 1.00 
Taiwan 5340 .7876 .21325 .00292 .7819 .7933 .00 1.00 
Indonesia 4320 .8049 .21674 .00330 .7985 .8114 .00 1.00 
Total 18817 .8127 .21040 .00153 .8097 .8157 .00 1.00 
F/(df1,df2)/sig. = 62.732/(3,18813)/0.000 
 
The country facts show that the trend toward democratic consolidation 
or deconsolidation varies.  They must therefore be seen case by case and we 
cannot offer a single general conclusion.  At the same time, there is an 
interesting phenomenon not previously observed in the literature: democratic 
support in Japan and Indonesia has softened, while in Korea and Taiwan it has 
strengthened.  Japan is the oldest consolidated democracy in Asia; it was part of 
Huntington’s so-called second wave of democracy (Huntington 1991).  Since the 
end of its post-World War II occupation by the US, Japan has been an 
uninterrupted democracy. 
Indonesia is the newest democracy, from its revolutionary nationalist 
inception in 1945.  The first democratic election was held in 1955, but the 
government produced by that election lasted only about four years, ending in 
1959 (Feith, 1962).  From then until 1998 Indonesia was governed by two 
authoritarian regimes, the Guided Democracy of President Sukarno and the 
New Order of President Suharto, for a total of nearly forty years.  A democratic 
regime was only reestablished in 1999, barely twenty years ago.  
Democratic deconsolidation thus appears to be occurring both in 
countries that have long been consolidated and that have only recently 
democratized.  What Japan is experiencing is perhaps similar to American, 
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Western European, Australian, and New Zealand experiences, as argued by Foa 
and Mounk (2016).  What Indonesia is experiencing is perhaps similar to other 
new democracies that have had difficulty consolidating.  In Southeast Asia, 
these countries include the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, though 
Indonesia is the one democracy in the region that was once regarded as Fully 
Free or consolidated by Freedom House, from 2006-2013.  At the same time, 
the signs of deconsolidation are not visible in Korea and Taiwan, where 
democratic support has tended to increase. 
How to explain these variations?  Do generational differences and 
declines in political interest explain the variation as Foa and Mounk claim?  Are 
they more impactful relative to education and democratic peformance, which 
have been found by many studies to be strong predictors of democracy? 
In the civic culture perspective, democracy can grow and perform well if 
it is supported by political engagement at the mass level, as shown by levels of 
political interest, voter turnout, and party identification.  Some analysts have 
argued specifically that democratic deconsolidation is associated with the 
decline of these indicators of engagement and that this decline is generational.  
Younger generations tend to be more apathetic politically (Foa and Mounk, 
2016: 10-11). 
In other words, the decline in democratic support is a function of the 
decline in political engagement, and both of these are associated with 
generational change.  Younger generations, and the millennial generation 
specifically, tend to be less engaged politically and might therefore be less 
supportive of democracy compared with more senior generations.  From a static 
generational perspective, the future of democracy is threatened because 
members of the millennial generation who will fill the ranks of future voters are 
much weaker supporters of democracy. 
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Figure. Trend of Democratic Support by Country 
(mean score on a 0-1 scale index) 
 
Is this the case in our four Asian democracies?  Do political interest and 
generation have an effect on democratic support after weighing other factors 
which in many studies have been found to strengthen it, especially democratic 
performance, economic condition, and several demographic factors, especially 
education?19 
A multivariate analysis reveals the relative effects of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable, i.e., democratic support as a measure of 
democratic consolidation at the attitudinal level (Table 3).20  In terms of political 
                                                 
19 On the relationship between education and democracy see Lipset (1959) and Norris (2011), and between 
democratic performance and democratic support see Mujani and Liddle (2015).  
20 In this analysis, the dependent variable is a 0-1 index of democratic support constructed from 5 items 
(see Table 2).  The independent variables are: 1) Millennial generation (40 years old or younger, coded 1, 
and other coded 0), 2) political interest (how interested would you say you are in politics? 1 = not at all 














2000 2006 2012 2018
All Japan Taiwan Korea Indonesia
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interest, its effect on democratic support in the four cases is not consistent (Table 
3).  The strongest influence is found in Taiwan, then in Japan, though not as 
strong as in Taiwan.  In Indonesia, political interest does have a strong 
influence, but a negative one, on democratic support.  The Indonesian 
phenomenon is also apparent in South Korea (Table 2).  Thus there is no 
general pattern that demonstrates the positive influence of political interest on 
democratic support. 
Intriguingly, this suggests that the conception or understanding of 
political interest in our several countries may not be the same.  The meaning of 
“interested in politics” and “support democracy” in the four Asian democracies 
may differ to the extent that the association, and the meaning of that 
association, among countries also differs considerably.  
Is the generational difference important?  When all citizens and survey 
waves are combined, generation does have an influence: the millennial 
generation is negatively associated with support for democracy, compared to the 
generation prior to it (Table 3).  This effect is consistent across waves and time.  
If examined by country, the negative effect is strongest in Japan, then Taiwan, 
then Indonesia.  If examined by wave per country, the negative effect is seen as 
                                                                                                                                                        
are you with the way democracy works in the country?  1=Not at all satisfied ... 4 = Very satisfied), 4) 
Economic condition (a 1-5 scale index constructed from 4 items: 1) overall economic condition of our 
country today, 2) the change in the economic condition of our country over the last few years, 3) the 
economic situation of your family today, 4) current economic condition of your family compared to it 
was a few years ago. Each item is a 1-5 scale (1 = very bad, 5 = very good), 5) education: level of 
education: 1 = never go to school ... 10 = college graduate or higher. 
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most consistent and strongest in Japan.  This is followed by Taiwan even though 
it is less strong or consistent.  The same is true for Indonesia.  
The four Asian democracies demonstrate that the generational effect 
toward democratic support varies, but is in general negative.  Generation is 
important for most of the cases and is consistent over time, but it clearly does 
not apply to all cases.  If compared with other factors, especially democratic 
performance and education, which in many other studies are very important for 
democratic support, the effects of political interest and generational difference 
are not as strong or as consisistent as democratic performance and education. 
 In the four Asian democracies, democratic performance increases 
democratic support consistently over time (Table 3).  In other words, more 
voters will support democracy if they assess positively democratic performance 
in their country regardless of generation.  As long as democracy performs well, 
both young and old will support it. 
 Education, which until now has been believed to be an important factor 
in strengthening democracy, does indeed appear to have that effect in this 
analysis.  Indeed, the positive effect of education on democratic support is much 
stronger and more consistent in the four democracies compared to the effect of 
generational differences and even more of political engagement.  Regardless of 
generation and political engagement, even regardless of democratic 
performance, education strengthens democratic support consistently (Table 3). 
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 Democratic support or democratic consolidation in the four Asian 
countries is strongly and positively influenced by education.  Because education 
levels tend to rise over time we expect that democratic support will be stronger 
in the future.  But generational differences also matter.  Millennials only weakly 
support democracies, but is it true that their political attitudes will not change 
when they become seniors?  Does political socialization end with their 
becoming mature citizens? 
Table 3. Multivariate Analysis of Democratic Support 
(Regression Coefficients and Std. Error) 



















































































































N 18,287 3,479 4,255 5,264 5,315 4,309 4,479 5,171 4,174 
R-square .053 .067 .069 .080 .042 .077 .012 .078 .058 
          
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Are democracies deconsolidating today, according to analyses based on opinion 
surveys?  One assessment claims they are.  In consolidated democracies, 
people’s preference or support for democracy has decreased and their support 
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for authoritarianism has increased (Foa and Mounk 2016; Croissant and 
Diamond 2020).  A second argues that democratic support versus authoritarian 
preference are always fluctuating over time and by country with no consistent 
trend (Inglehart 2016).  Which is more realistic or better reflects the data? 
In our four Asian democracies the second assessment is more realistic.  
Popular preference for democracy rather than authoritarianism in general has 
strengthened, but it does appear to fluctuate over time and over country.  How 
can we explain this variation?  
Foa and Mounk argue that the civic culture model helps explain the 
decline of democratic support in consolidated democracies.  Specifically, they 
refer to political interest as a component of civic culture to predict democratic 
support.  In their model, if political interest increases democratic preference will 
as well.  Foa and Mounk found that political interest in consolidated 
democracies has decreased, and this decrease explains the decline of  democratic 
support.  In addition, they argue that generational difference explains 
democratic deconsolidation.  The millenial generation is less likely to support 
democracy.  Millenial rejection will therefore weaken democracies, as the 
millenials will continue to comprise a larger share of the population relative to 
their seniors.  
This article has demonstrated that in the four Asian democracies there is 
no consistent relationship between political interest and democratic support.  
This component of the civic culture model does not consistently explain 
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democratic consolidation.  The generational effect is also inconsistent.  The 
negative impact of the millenials is visible in Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia, but 
not in Korea.  In addition, the claim that generation matters to regime support 
should take into account the extent to which attitudes toward democracy are 
stable over time rather than over life cycle because of the possible continuing 
impact of political socialization on future generations. 
Political economy is an alternative model, according to which the 
public’s assessment of a country’s economic condition will affect how it 
evaluates regime performance, which will in turn explain regime support.  If the 
economy is strong, then people will be satisfied with how democracy is working, 
which will increase their democratic support. 
The four Asian democracies show that the political economic model 
more persuasively explains democratic support versus authoritarian preference 
compared to the civic culture model.  A citizen who is satisfied with the way 
democracy has worked in his or her country very significantly supports 
democracy.  At the same time, citizens who are not satisfied with democratic 
performance very significantly prefer authoritarianism. 
This article has also demonstrated the significance of education in 
bolstering democratic support.  The positive effect of education is significant and 
consistent across country and over time in the four democracies.  The higher the 
level of education the higher the democratic support.  This evidence confirms 
many previous studies, but was absent in Foa and Mount’s analysis.  
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Because the trend toward more and higher education continues to be 
strong in the four countries as well, the effect on democratic support will 
continue to be positive.  Democratic performance and education in the future 
will help contain the possibility of a weakening of that support in the four 
democracies, and perhaps elsewhere in the world as well. 
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